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LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS FOR A USAWC SINO-SOVIET WAR GAME
AND
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST ASIA

by

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Goncz
Ordnance Corps

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS FOR A USAWC SINO-SOVIET WAR GAME

and

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST ASIA •

9 INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT,

by

10

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Goncz
Ordnance Corps

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The specific objective of this paper is to describe the logistics considerations in a variety of war games studied and to recommend specific measures for incorporating logistics into a US Army War College Sino-Soviet War Game. This very specific objective is a very small sub-set of my original set of objectives, perceptions, and preconceived notions about the role of the United States in East Asia and the Pacific. My original objectives of increasing my knowledge have been met. My original perceptions and preconceived notions have changed. This paper then has two purposes. The first is to describe the logistics aspects of the war games studied, to indicate the massive effort required to incorporate other than a cursory logistics consideration in a war game, and to note the dearth of information available for incorporation in a Sino-Soviet War Game. The second is to outline my original objectives, perceptions, and convictions and show how they have changed after a year of study at the US Army War College.

BACKGROUND

A year at the US Army War College is many things:
a period of scholastic professional development, a chance

to meet one's peers with whom one will work in the future, and an opportunity to enlarge one's view beyond the confines of division sized units. The sabbatical comes at a good time--a period of transition--to those perceived as being successful and as already having surpassed the expectations of a normal career. Thus, the greatest benefit of this sabbatical is the opportunity, I might say obligation, to pause, reflect, and expand one's knowledge.

Professionally, my background is logistics having served first in the Transportation Corps and then in the Ordnance Corps since 1961. My civilian education concentrated on business administration with a good foundation at the undergraduate level followed with a Master's Degree in Nuclear Physics. My military experience consisted of the Ordnance Advanced Course and the Command & General Staff College Course by correspondence and assignments in logistics units or on the staff of a research and development effort. The final element in establishing the parameters of the framework in which I viewed events and evaluated situations was my 22½ months of command of a general support maintenance battalion in V Corps, USAREUR. In this environment readiness was the dominant theme every day. Every effort was devoted to providing better and quicker maintenance support and expanding the types of support provided. There was little time to think of other than having the forces ready to meet the Warsaw Pact Forces

threat. There was time to see that the United States was focusing all its efforts on NATO, that improvements were being made, and that the rate of accomplishments was increasing. To me the Pacific area was far away and of little concern. I little understood our interests despite our deep involvement beginning with World War II, though I viewed with some secret relish the prospect of a Sino-Soviet conflict. In a perverse way I felt the elements that contributed to the tensions along the Sino-Soviet border were the just rewards of our antagonists, the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that it was in the interest of the United States to fuel the resulting discontent as a counterbalance to the threat facing the NATO forces.

ORIGINAL PROFILE

I viewed the forthcoming year as an opportunity to expand my knowledge beyond the confines of battalion sized operations and beyond the framework founded on a scientific/technological background and work in logistics and research and development. What this meant was an opportunity to delve into the political, socio-psychological, and economic aspects of a situation though, in the beginning, these desires were vaguely formulated. I was convinced that the focus of the interests of the United States was solely Europe and that with this focus and the bringing

to bear all our assets and capabilities the problems would be solved.

I was equally convinced that the United States was withdrawing as an Asian power. This perception was based on a view that power and influence derived solely from military might and presence. Our precipitous withdrawal from Vietnam, the announced policy of withdrawing ground forces from South Korea, and the downgrading of both the size and numbers of MAAGs throughout the Pacific all presaged a reduction of the influence of the United States. The swell of actions and commentary involving the "Taiwan" problem and the need to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China cast further doubts about the coherence of our Asia Policy, even doubts about the existence of a policy. In general the area was quiet with scattered newspaper accounts of insurgent activities and clashes along the border of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and the Republic of Kampuchea (Cambodia). But most persistent were reports of incidents along the Sino-Soviet border that indicated a strong possibility of conflict. I saw that if such a conflict should arise the United States should support the mainland Chinese and, if conflict did not occur, to abet the tensions that existed.

The call to participate in the formulation of a USAWC Sino-Soviet War game seemed propitious in its timing and the most appropriate vehicle I could find for providing a

framework in which to study the Far East. The scenario included the political, geographic, socio-psychological, economic, and military considerations appropriate to a study of a particular situation that, while specific, was a major concern in the development of an Asian policy. The underlying assumption; i.e., a Sino-Soviet conflict, fit my preconceived notions as to what was important. It further promised in microcosm all the elements for considering the Far East in general.

OBJECTIVES

My objectives, using the Sino-Soviet War Game effort as a vehicle, became the following:

1. Expand my knowledge of the area including Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.
2. Concentrate on Northeast Asia where the interests of the United States (US), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Japan, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) converge.
3. Develop a knowlege of war-gaming.
4. Consider the options for incorporating logistics considerations in the Sino-Soviet war game.
5. Synthesize the results from my studies of the first four objectives into a coherent and meaningful to me policy for the US in the Far East.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES

Study in support of the objectives proceeded in three categories. The first category involved the curriculum and exploiting every opportunity; e. g., oral presentations and written reports, for area concentration during the core phase of the U. S. in the World Environment concurrent with the Strategic Military Studies. The views of the several guest speakers were also valuable in contributing to my general knowledge and the organization of thoughts. The second category involved outside reading and study. The third category consisted of visits to outside agencies; e. g., OSD(PA&E) and the DIA, and a trip to the Far East. This trip was indeed the capstone of this study effort. It gave me the opportunity to visit once again since my last tours; South Korea in 1967 and South Vietnam in 1972. My itinerary was as follows: CINCPAC and CINCPAC Support Group in Hawaii; HQ, ROK Army, the I Corps (ROK/US) Group, and the ROK/US Operational Planning Staff in Korea; and the Taiwan Defense Command, the MAAG, and the Republic of China (ROC) Armed Forces University in Taiwan. This trip reinforced my memory of the vastness of the Pacific area, highlighted the dispersion of our forces, and emphasized that military power was but one element in the totality of what constitutes power and influence. These visits and the trip gave me the opportunity to talk with people involved in war-gaming whose logistics considerations ranged from virtually none to one in which the

total thrust of the simulation, either manual or computer assisted, was logistics. Further, I found only a few isolated individuals in a few organizations concerned with the possibility of a Sino-Soviet conflict and the possible implications for the US. Finally, the inputs from talking to a range of military and civilian personnel helped to coalesce my thoughts into a coherent whole.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

Chapter II will be devoted to a synthesis of the logistics aspects of the simulations studied. Chapter III will be an exposition of how I perceive events evolving in the Far East and what the US policies should be. In Chapter IV I will discuss the narrower issue, the Sino-Soviet Conflict, and the implications for the US. Finally, in Chapter V I will summarize the major conclusions and recommendations. This paper will not be a trip report summarizing all the excellent discussions I have had nor will it attempt to create an audit trail on how my original perceptions and convictions changed to those which I will express. Furthermore, it is impossible to document and justify my every viewpoint. Any deliberation that reaches a conclusion is of necessity a tortuous one, ever subject to influence consciously and unconsciously, and in the final analysis a judgment.

CHAPTER II

LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SINO-SOVIET WAR GAME

The specific research objectives of this study effort in support of the work on the Sino-Soviet war game were the following:

1. Identification of the means by which logistics and, in particular maintenance, are factored into I Corps war games.
2. Identification of logistics and, in particular, maintenance aspects of the Sino-Soviet war game conducted by the Armed Forces Staff College, ROC.
3. Evaluation of logistics play in the DIA, CIA and OASD (PA&E) Sino-Soviet war games.
4. A description of the extent and reliability of the logistics considerations in the war games studied.
5. Recommendations for incorporating logistics considerations into the USAWC Sino-Soviet war game.

This chapter is devoted to these objectives, less the work of the DIA and CIA, and will have added to it simulation work in support of the ROK logistics systems and a discussion of work on the PRC and Soviet logistics.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA AMMO-WAR GAME '77

Following is a short synopsis of an excellent two hour briefing at the Office, Chief of Ordnance, HQ, ROKA

and the excellent, very complete, after action report.¹
The exercise, ordered by the Chief of Ordnance, was designed to test the internal Korean Class V logistics system from depot through the intermediate Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) to the direct support (forward) ASPs to the using units. External resupply and the receiving ports were not played. Especially noteworthy is the realization that this ammo-war game was initiated by the HQ, ROKA; is the first solely logistics exercise by the ROKA; and was the first of a series to test the logistics system. Equally detailed exercises were scheduled in April, 1978 for the POL distribution system and for the transportation, to include rail, highway, and air, system.

Massive is the only word to describe the level of detailed planning and data gathering and personnel involvement. Planning, data gathering, game design, and rehearsal took from 1 Sep 77 through 12 Dec 77. The actual game was played manually from 13-17 Dec 77 in real time with a control group of more than 20 people and an execution group of over 100 people. The 596 page after action report that gives every single detail of the exercise was filed on 28 Feb 78.

The data collected and used was extremely detailed. As examples, the complete stockage by type and quantity at each storage location, the specific types of MHE, the receiving and shipping capability by tonnage and time by location,

actual paperwork processing times, parking capacities, manpower and mobilization, and the actual number of trucks and rail cars and their capacities were all detailed and played. Support requirements down to the number and type of pencils were programmed. Also, current OPLANS, wartime logistics planning and procedures, and actual Class V expenditure rates were played. Finally, 1:2000 relief maps, with cut-outs representing men, transportation assets, and MHE were played for each ASP to control the play of ammo in and out.

Very valid and honest deficiencies in the Class V system were identified. These included maldistribution of ammo by type and quantity, inadequate types and quantities of MHE, problems in the distribution of storage capacities, and problems in road nets, to name a few. A very valid observation is that very few of the problems identified came as a surprise or would have come as a surprise if one were to make more than a casual look at the system. The point is the deficiencies were identified in detail, with quantitative data to support the degree of deficiency, and that these data then became the basis for a meaningful correction program in the ROKA budget.

The encouraging aspect of this war game is that the ROKA is looking at its logistics system, is taking corrective action based on quantitative data, is undertaking this effort on its own initiative, and is doing superbly detailed staff work.

This model, or form of war game, has no applicability to the USAWC Sino-Soviet War Game. The level of detailed knowledge is too great and the exercise is too labor intensive. However, it does serve as a model of what could be done within the US Class V system at Corps level and below vice the traditional CPX or FTX type exercise.

KOREA FIRST BATTLE

The specific procedures for this simulation is in the Wargame Manual for the Korea First Battle.² The simulation is designed to exercise commanders and their staffs from Corps Group to company level. It has the feature of being capable of being sliced at any level down; i. e., division level and lower, etc. The actual commanders and staffs are the players. It is this feature that emphasizes the simulation's purpose as opposed to that of a simulation designed to decide the outcomes of battles. When this distinction is preserved, the accuracy of the data used, the range and scope of the play, and the statistical means of applying the data become less critical. Nevertheless, the experiences from the outcomes of this simulation in support of the CAPER CROWN exercises, coupled with sound military judgment, are used to make modifications to plans.

The simulation is austere to the extent that a computer is not used. Only a Wang desk computer is used to assist in laborious calculation. Actual OPLANS, tactics and procedures are used, so that the exercise has a great dual

of authenticity and is invaluable in developing expertise and confidence among commanders and staffs.

Logistics is played only for the US/ROK side. The four aspects played are artillery ammunition resupply, artillery weapons failures for maintenance, ASP ammunition movement and issue, and highway regulation. Furthermore, only selected, representative items of ammunition are played, selected repair parts are tracked, and only major units and ammunition resupply are controlled for highway regulation. The play is in real time by the personnel who would do the same tasks in wartime using actual procedures and paperwork. Control of the play is visually aided by a very large terrain relief board. As an indication of the scope of the effort for a Corps Group exercise, a goodly portion of the real estate on Camp Red Cloud is needed to provide working space for the hundreds of people involved, the communications, and all the support required.

The maintenance play focuses on the 105 mm howitzer and some 31 parts. Maintenance failures are based on established failure rates based on the number of rounds fired. Weapons are removed from play until repaired by organizational or direct support personnel using repair parts from the supply system or by cannibalization. The repair times are based on experience to the extent possible or by using the Delphi technique when hard data are not available. Factors considered are evacuation times, parts availability, the echelon of maintenance required, and the

availability of contact teams. This approach requires detailed knowledge of repair parts availability and location, knowledge of the time required to move parts and perform the maintenance, and the status of maintenance personnel. Accuracy of the maintenance play depends on the accuracy of the failure rates and leads to what I feel is unjustified carping about the routine. What is important is the fact that a degree of realism is added to the play by the logistics routines employed and the fact that commanders and staffs are forced to face the realities and suffer the frustrations of these realities. The other three logistics routines have essentially the same degree of sophistication as the maintenance routine and my comments would be the same for these.

This model also has no applicability to the USAWC Sino-Soviet War Game. It is designed to exercise actual commanders and staffs in actual OPLANS. The level of data required is very detailed and the actual play in real time requires great numbers of personnel and a large supporting infrastructure. However, I will say it is superbly designed for carrying out the objective of the simulation.

SIGNALOGEX

The ROK/US Operational Planning Staff under the supervision of HQ, UNC/USFK/EA is responsible for wargaming for the U. S. Forces, Korea. The Planning Staff has taken the

last three years to make SIMALOGEX, a requirements model developed by the Rand Corporation and used by the Logistics Evaluation Agency, Korea specific and perfect in detail. It is solely a logistics model, has the complete ROK Army and logistics system on tape, and takes a computer of large capacity provided by the Korean Institute of Technology (KIST) to run it. Every army unit through the mobilization phases (over 1600) with its specific TO&E personnel and equipment and the units' locations are on the tapes. The model is used to test logistics requirements and develop logistics policies. It deals solely with the in-country situation and with the Army. The work to date has been documented in a SIGMALOGEX I report with executive summary. Unfortunately, a copy of this report to be provided to the USAWC has as yet not arrived. The responsibility for running the model and keeping it current is now being transferred to ROKA. The Planning Staff next plans to incorporate the Navy and the Air Force into the model.

Time is played in five day brackets. Depending on the scenario played, several different requirements outputs can be obtained. Casualty and hospital requirements address medical support and troop replacement needs. Materiel requirements by class of supply by region, with six regions comprising the front, can be predicted. Missile and conventional ammunition requirements by particular ASP assist

in testing the transportation system, ammunition distribution plans, and ASP requirements. The same kind of predictions can be made for both packaged and bulk POL. The model really has the whole logistics system on tape from the transportation system of ports, airheads, and rail, through the depots to include their locations and stockage levels through the intermediate supply points to the using level. It obviously needs the large capacity computer supporting it, is very sophisticated, and requires a massive amount of detailed information. Now that the model has been perfected and made Korea specific, meaningful diagnoses of the logistics system and policies are being made.

Were one desirous of looking at a complete logistics system and had the level of detail needed at hand SIGMA-LOGEX is the model needed and it is available at LEA. However, I cannot conceive of the USAWC Sino-Soviet War Game having as one of its objectives such a thorough look at either logistics system. In any case the level of detail required just would not be available.

SINO-SOVIET WAR GAME
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE - REPUBLIC OF CHINA

This wargame consists of a tattered outline sketch of the PRC taped to the wall on which two Soviet thrust scenarios are depicted. The first has Manchuria and its

capitol as the objectives. The second has the seizure and destruction of fixed nuclear launch facilities as the objective. Both thrusts are for the purpose of gaining political control. Division sized units are played and a Wang desk computer is used to calculate relative firepower. The PRC is always played on the defensive. Logistics is recognized as a big problem, but is not played. The PRC is considered to be on the advantage by virtue of its being on its homeland and the possibility of conflict is considered to be the rationale for the Soviets building the Baikal-Amur-Mainline (BAM) railroad. The game is not documented and has not been played for a long time; however, it does form a basis for interesting discussions. As a model it does not provide assistance for the USAWC Sino-Soviet War Game. However, the ROC personnel can provide useful insights as to terrain, tactics, objectives, and possible scenarios.

IDAHEX

IDAHEX is a computerized model of conventional land warfare at the theater level. It has been implemented on the Pentagon's MULTICS system and on the Central Intelligence Agency's IBM S/370. The model is completely documented in explicit detail.³ Three roles are required to use IDAHEX. The game designer prepares the input data such as the terrain, the order of battle, weapons effectiveness, and the mobility of resources. The red player

and the blue player communicate instructions to their forces through the computer. The program includes the logic for handling maneuver and combat and frees the game designer to concentrate on the specifics of the data. The players make the operational decisions while the computer does the computation and bookkeeping while keeping the players informed of the status of the play. It is an extremely sophisticated model that requires a large capacity computer and a minimum of people. Furthermore, the level of detail can be widely varied, depending on the scenario desired, from that which is quite simplistic to that which is extremely detailed.

Logistics are played to the extent that units are given supplies that are attrited through the logic of the game. Note: It would be important to understand the logic of attrition. Terrain, to include trafficability, is played. The movement of supplies and replacements and the lines of communication (LOCs) can be explicitly played. LOCs can be damaged by the application of ground resources and the same can be repaired by the commitment of resources. The movement of supplies is constrained by the availability of transport and the LOCs.

This model has the sophistication to handle the requisite data and provide the richness of operational options whereby meaningful theater level conventional war games can be played. Also, it includes an appropriate

level of logistics considerations so that realistic constraints are imposed on maneuver and combat. On the other hand the logistics data required are not so burdensome that the objective of analyzing opposing forces is not lost. This model has definite applicability for the USAWC Sino-Soviet War Game depending on the availability of an adequate computer and the requisite data base.

Logistics Studies

I found a dearth of studies devoted to the logistics considerations of a Sino-Soviet conflict. One, which will be useful when it is published and distributed in May, 1978 by the Intelligence Center Pacific, studies the throughput capacity of the rail and road nets along the PRC side of the border.⁴

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. HQ Republic of Korea Army, Chief of Ordnance, After Action Report of "Ammo-War Game '77" (U), SECRET.
2. HQ I Corps Group (ROK/US), Korea First Battle - Wargame Manual(U), draft, UNCLASSIFIED.
3. Paul Olsen, IDAREX: A Maneuver-Oriented Model of Conventional Land Warfare.
4. Intelligence Center Pacific, PRC Logistics Capabilities along the Sino-Soviet Frontier (U), To be published, SECRET.

CHAPTER III

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

Our fundamental concern in Asia and the Pacific is that no single nation or group of nations achieves an hegemony. This policy derives from a recognition of how we as Americans desire to live in the World Community. We wish to preserve our nation's existence and to live in peace. We wish to live as a nation free to pursue our political destiny in a world that, while not necessarily desirous of parallelling our form of government, is at least not inimical to it. Also, the economic well-being of all citizens must be provided for in a framework that recognizes that the economies of all nations are becoming increasingly interdependent. Finally, citizens desire to live in an environment conducive to self-fulfillment and the pursuit of their own interests.

It has often been stated that the United States is an Asian Power and intends to remain one.¹ However, what is meant by the term "Asian Power" is not defined. One is left to infer that what is meant is military power. I reject that as inadequate and as one based on a perception of the world as it existed after World War II. This view is based on a bipolar world construct, a policy of containment of World Communism, and the successes and failures of our military involvements in Korea, insurgencies, and Vietnam.

The world has changed and the elements of power have changed. In defining our foreign policies and objectives, our efforts must be based on an objective evaluation of the current situation, unclouded by past prejudices and perceptions. Consider the status of three of our allies; Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Each can be termed an economic miracle, though each is at a different stage in its development. Taiwan is ready to burst forth. South Korea is improving the economic well-being of its citizens and is beginning to establish its own defense production capability. Japan's success is well-known with its having the world's third largest GNP. Each enjoyed the United States defense umbrella under a mutual defense treaty and, more important, foreign policies of the United States designed to reconstruct and enhance the economy while defense capabilities were built and offensive capabilities were restrained.

Another source of power is science and technology. Developing this expertise is fundamental to a thriving economy and a strong military. It is with the benefits that the world will be fed, nations will be industrialized to provide jobs and the material outputs to satisfy rising expectations, and new sources of energy will be developed. Our technological expertise and management skill are priceless assets that should be exploited and become an integral part of our foreign policy. We will have to do better than we have done in the past. The following indictment spells

it out clearly.²

The finding of this study is that U. S. diplomacy is neglecting two powerful instruments of policy formation and policy execution: technological expertise and management skill.....

Technology has made intolerable the consequences of failure to attain the primary objectives of U. S. foreign policy. But technology also offers many opportunities for attainment of these objectives. No element of national policy and no component of national program warrants more respect in the short-range or the long-range future of the United States.

However, both these sources of power create inherent vulnerabilities commensurate with the degree of attainment. Strong economies demand a constant flow of resources. Japan is a prime example with its almost complete dependence on oil imports. They also demand world markets for their outputs. Also, the more developed a country, the more there is to lose in a conflict. In sum, the world is becoming increasingly interdependent for resources, markets, and technology. This interdependence is fostered by instant communications, increasing access of more peoples to various media, and the ease and speed of travel.

Our interests in East Asia and the Pacific are fundamentally economic, political, and ideological. It is in our interest to protect trade and investments, to foster open trade, to control and reduce pollution, to ensure access to materials, and to foster the individual economic and social welfare of all peoples. This requires the maintenance and political stability. From these are derived interests in open

sea and air lines of communications, stable and autonomous governments, and governments whose ideologies are not inimical to ours. Concurrent with this is a recognition that with economic viability, the responsibility for defense will be assumed by the individual states with a reduction in dependency on the United States.

In developing policies in support of these interests, there are three prime considerations. First, the vastness and diversity of the area encompassing nations and seas from India and the Indian Ocean to Japan and the Northeast Pacific. The degree of our interest can be thought of as increasing from one of benign neglect, as we consider nations such as Nepal and Bhutan, as we proceed Northeast along a crescent to the area of intense concern where the interests of the four powers -- the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and the United States (US) -- converge.³ Second, throughout this region we have substantial investments, trade markets, and sources of resources. Third, there is the potential for internal and regional instability in developing nations; e. g., Indonesia, PRC, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), coupled with the hegemonic designs of differing political systems; e. g., North Korea, PRC, and the SRV.

The foundation of our relations in Asia is determined by our relationship with Japan. Our vital interest in the

Far East is the preservation of the independence and economic strength of Japan. Our two way trade with Japan exceeds \$25 Billion yearly. Japan is key to what I see evolving into a three way balance of power among Japan, PRC, and the USSR. With the United States initiatives toward the normalization of relations with the PRC, Japan unhampered by past commitments to Taiwan easily made the shift from diplomatic relations with Taiwan to relations with the PRC while retaining strong economic ties with Taiwan. Unfortunately, this easy shift is not available to the United States. Nevertheless, Japan now has free and easy access to the PRC. The same access exists with the USSR strained by the absence of a peace treaty and the "Northern Territories" Islands. This does not prevent economic ties with the USSR. A good example of this sort of cooperation is the recent agreement to start a full fledged test boring off Sakhalin in a joint effort to tap undersea oil and natural gas.⁴

It is in our interest to maintain strong ties with Japan, while Japan is faced with a range of options. She can maintain the status quo, align with either the USSR or the PRC, or develop a greater independence. Ancient animosities and fear of the USSR, a desire to avoid dominance by the PRC, and a recognition of changing United States perceptions of Asia, coupled with a sense of strength and accomplishment will lead inevitably to Japan developing greater independence and military power. However, her inherent economic and military vulnerabilities will her to maintain some sort of alliance with one of the major powers. This option

is now being discussed openly in Japan.⁵ Traditionally, she has spent less than 1% of the GNP of defense. The United States spends about 6%, while feeling strong competing demands for the budget dollars. Also, it seems to me that the sentiment in the United States will be increasingly opposed to the commitment of American troops in an Asian war. These trends dictate a policy of encouraging Japan's militarization to achieve a balance of power in Northeast Asia and to allow a decrease in the American commitment. This policy should be implemented with actions designed to show continuing involvement with Japan; e. g., providing the nuclear umbrella, increased interaction between the countries' military staffs, and discourse between the governments on any subject of mutual interest.

South Korea is a key factor in Northeast Asia. She is an important trading partner. However, she does not share to the degree that Japan does dedication to democratic principles. Nevertheless, her independence is critical to maintaining stability and the credibility of the United States. Our policy should be one of decreasing our military commitment so as to avoid being forced into a land engagement. However, timing is critical and should depend on quid pro quos from North Korea. Today, the answer is moot as to the outcome should North Korea invade. However, the 2d Infantry now provides the necessary deterrence.

In the next few years one can expect the economic and military postures of North and South Korea to become even

more disparate. The time is running out when North Korea could unite the two Koreas militarily, even if United States ground forces were withdrawn. Furthermore, no encouragement from either the PRC or the USSR should be expected by North Korea as these two are equally interested in maintaining peace and stability to allow pursuit of their development objectives. This status should be exploited by espousing a two Korea solution as a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of American ground forces. The success of that thrust and a policy which supports the continuing economic growth of South Korea and the development of a defense industry are what should dictate the withdrawal schedule.

There is a paranoic relation between the PRC and the USSR based on ancient animosities and border disputes.

On the one hand, the USSR fears the "yellow peril" and the PRC fears a continued "Tsarist Imperialistic" expansion. Both have troops on the border.⁶ Our policy should be that this is not our problem, to encourage neither side in the dispute, nor to align with either. It is tempting to align with the PRC as a counter to the threat facing NATO. However, such a move would be patently obvious and redound to our disadvantage should those relations change. What should be done is to encourage Japan's balanced relations with both, while we pursue our policies with the USSR in areas of mutual interest and while the dilemma we find ourselves in with regard to Taiwan and the PRC is resolved.

The dilemma is that we now perceive ourselves as having to extricate ourselves from a civil war. This is in contrast to our perception once of having to stem the tide of Communism. Right now the PRC is pursuing its policies of developing its agriculture, its scientific and technological base in order to become an equal by the year 2000, and its military.^{7,8,9} The requirement for normalization is obvious. The potential for trade, the PRC's growing military might vis-a-vis the USSR and Japan, and the PRC's potential as a source of energy dictate that.¹⁰ But, the PRC has more to gain than the United States with normalization, especially in the area of technology transfer. Perhaps this is the key that will resolve the dilemma.

The Shanghai Communique, skillfully worded, commits the United States to letting the Chinese resolve the status of Taiwan. The PRC demands that the United States abrogate the Taiwan Defense Treaty, remove all military presence, and recognize diplomatically the PRC while disestablishing formal relations with the Republic of China (ROC) are unacceptable. However tempting it might be for such a quick solution, we have a moral obligation to the Taiwanese to preserve for them the opportunity to choose their form of government and economy. I believe that in the long run Taiwan will opt to be independent or opt for a political settlement that will afford a degree of acceptable autonomy under the control of the PRC. We should support the

economic development of Taiwan, discourage polemics involving the retaking of the mainland, and work with the leaders in Taiwan to seek a solution.

In dealing with the PRC, the United States policies should emphasize our commitment to the self-determination of the Taiwanese, our need to maintain credibility, and our desire for a solution to the dilemma that is amicable to both the PRC and the ROC. Talks should emphasize the mutual benefit of expanded relations between the United States and the PRC, especially in terms that portray our seeing the greater benefit accruing to the PRC.

I have concentrated on Northeast Asia because our main interests lie there. A survey of all of East Asia gives the impression of relative quiescence. However, the localized warfare between Cambodia and SRV is also a manifestation of competition for influence between the USSR and the PRC. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a loose federation of states building an interlocking relationship of bilateral agreements. ASEAN faces the prospect of hegemonic designs by Indochina states should the internecine warfare between Cambodia and the SRV be settled. Thailand feels the immediate pressure. Our policy toward ASEAN should be one of encouragement through economic development, conferring status and legitimacy through diplomatic representation, and military aid. Our desire in this area would be for political stability and the maintenance of internal security.

Our policies should be designed to promote peace and stability and be based on balanced relationship with the powers; USSR, PRC, and ASEAN, and with a total commitment to Japan. There should be continuing dialogues with each to explain our policies couched in terms to accentuate the self-interest of each. Above all, we should remain steadfast in our ideals and commitments.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. Bernard Weinraub, "Brown Says U. S. Will Strengthen Its Forces In Asia," New York Times, 21 February 1978, p. C7.

2. US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence, Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, Committee Print, Washington: Government Printing Office, June, 1976, p. xxi.

This is quoted from the preface of the final volume of a six year study. The methodology of the study was to consider in matrix format six cases illustrating the interaction of science, technology, and American diplomacy against six substantive issue which illustrated the interaction. The results, while praising many initiatives such as the "Atoms for Peace" proposal and the Mekong project, raise serious questions as to the initiative vs. reactive nature of U. S. foreign policy, the capabilities within the State Department, the bilateral vs. multilateral approach of so much of U. S. work, and the short-term vs. long-term approach to politics.

3. A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 253.

4. "Japan, Russia to Start Joint Boring," Japan Times (Tokyo), 16 March 1978, p. 6.

5. Henry Scott-Stokes, "Defense Increases Urged by Japanese," New York Times, 14 May 1978, p. 9.

6. Kevin Klose, "Soviets Assail China's Stand on Disputed Border," Washington Post, 2 April 1978, p. A1.
7. Jay Mathews, "Chinese Army Turns from Mao's Work to Maneuvers," Washington Post, 9 February 1978, p. A17.
8. Jay Mathews, "China Congress Opens; Focus on Hua," Washington Post, 27 February 1978, p. A14.
9. Daniel S. Greenberg, "China's Push to Close the Science Gap," Washington Post, 18 April 1978, p. A19.
10. Fox Butterfield, "Further Oil Finds Reported off China; Major Field Planned," New York Times, 6 May 1978, p. 29.

CHAPTER IV

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST: THE SINO-SOVIET SUBSET

In the last chapter I developed the thesis that the United States interests in the vast Far East-Pacific Ocean area began with what I suggested as benign neglect in the area of the Indian Ocean and the nations contiguous to it (Africa is not included in this discussion) which can be looked at as one end of a crescent. Further, the intensity of interest and degree of involvement should increase as one proceeds along this crescent through South East Asia to the other end, Northeast Asia. It is here where the interests of the four major powers converge that our interests become vital, where the elements of power and interests of the four are complex and in a constant state of flux, and where our policies have the most impact.

I have proposed a set of policies which is designed to protect our interests. I would like to focus now in more detail on our relations with the PRC in the context of U. S. and PRC interests and the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The possibility of conflict between the PRC and the USSR is potentially the most destabilizing occurrence in the Far East. The antagonism that has its roots in the "unequal" border treaties, racism, and ideological differences erupted into a major crisis in 1969 in a series of bloody clashes

over a disputed island along the disputed border.¹ Since this major crisis was defuzed, there have been continuing reports of border incidents.² The latest incident generated a strong protest by the PRC, an apology and a markedly different version of the facts by the USSR, and yet did not interfere with a regularly scheduled session of the Soviet-Chinese border talks.^{3,4} Soviet President Brezhnev's recent thirteen day trip across the continent to the Far East to highlight government concerns about economic developments in Siberia also served the purpose of highlighting Soviet concern about the disputed border area and determination not to accede to PRC demands for Soviet troop withdrawals.^{5,6} Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng while signalling a hope for closer ties with the United States used the opportunity to rebuke the Soviets and their "policy of hostility" toward China.⁷ The significant fact to derive is that the leaders of both countries have not allowed the serious clash of 1969 and the intermittent, but recurrent, border incidents in the ensuing nine years to erupt into a shooting war. Therefore, I believe that the position stated by the PRC that war is inevitable is largely polemical. The ancient antagonisms continue. But the resolution of the problem continues to be sought in the political arena even though each side resorts to the projection of military power by the stationing of upwards of one-half million men on each side.

The leadership is concerned with problems. The Soviets are striving to develop oil and gas production in Western

Siberia, natural gas in the Yakutsk fields, and several other huge scale economic projects; all designed to broaden the industrial base and increase output. The Baikal-Amur Mainline railroad paralleling to the North the Trans-Siberian railroad is another huge project scheduled to be completed in 1983 with a projected cost of more than \$15 billion dollars.⁸ There are indications that the principal purpose of this project is military.⁹ However, when it is built, vast areas in Siberia will be opened and access will be gained to potentially huge reserves of natural resources. All these projects can come to fruition only if there is an absence of hostilities. Some of the other concerns of the Soviet leadership are Soviet relations with the Eastern European nations and the threat the NATO forces poses to the USSR.

I have already detailed in the last chapter the PRC announced goals of increasing agricultural production, achieving scientific and technological parity with Western nations by the year 2000, and modernizing its military.

Again, these goals can only be achieved if an absence of hostilities prevails.

It is these considerations of what I perceive to be the national interests of the USSR and the PRC to rate the probability of a Sino-Soviet conflict to be low, while recognizing that the possibility exists.

It is in the context of all these conditions that the PRC has sought to design its foreign policy relations with the USSR and the United States and in which the United States

must design its foreign policy and courses of action with the PRC. For the United States the objective is to establish a relation that will serve to facilitate the settlement of Asian problems, enhance peace and stability, and maintain the confidence of our allies. The policies need to preserve the traditional strong political and economic ties between the United States and the Republic of China and also encourage PRC actions that will deter Soviet threats to Asian stability without a resultant Soviet over-reaction or conflict.¹⁰

Both the PRC and the United States recognizing the barrenness of a policy which fails to recognize each other have embarked on a course of improving relations. The basic differences were clearly delineated in the Joint Communiqué issued at Shanghai on 27 February, 1972.¹¹ Several excellent principles were enumerated on which future policies were to be based. These included a recognition that "progress toward normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries," that "both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict," that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region," that "neither is prepared to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states," and that "it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries..." The

Chinese affirmed that the "Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations." The United States did not challenge the position that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China" and affirmed "its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." The United States affirmed the "objective of withdrawal of all U. S. forces and military installations from Taiwan."

These set of principles and affirmations form a solid basis for our policies. First, it should be crystal clear that the United States should be completely neutral on any issue involving the Sino-Soviet dispute and avoid any appearance of promoting PRC interests to the disadvantage of the Soviets. Secondly, the continuance of traditional relations with the ROC is in our interest and is key to maintaining credibility with our allies and the PRC. Third, any action that smacks of expediency in relations with the USSR or the PRC would be an unstable basis for relations with that country and cause poor relations with the other. The following quote summarizes this thought nicely: ¹²

If the United States were to abandon an old and friendly ally to win the favor of one Communist regime, Chinese leaders would have reason to suspect that the United States would have even less scruples about abandoning a tactical alliance with China if it seemed expedient to win Soviet favor.

This credo which addresses the Taiwan question and is founded on a respect for commitments and our fundamental

ideals of honesty and forthrightness dictate that our policies with the PRC recognize her as a major power and that agreements serve the mutual self interest of both.

It also serves as a basis for addressing the Taiwan question. The United States has three options; maintenance of the status quo, precipitous recognition of the PRC and severance of full diplomatic relations with the ROC, or a two China solution. The third option is not viable for the PRC and therefore cannot serve as a basis for US and PRC relations. The second violates our commitments and ideals. Therefore, the first which now serves the interests of the PRC, so long as the United States upholds the principles of the Shanghai Communique, and the United States will have to serve as the basis for improving relations. In this context the United States must work to encourage the leaders of the PRC and the ROC to achieve an agreement satisfactory to both that recognizes the legitimate aspirations of the Taiwanese. In the meantime, the status quo serves the interests of both the PRC and United States so long as adamant and polarized positions are not touted.

In the meantime, the United States and the PRC can work to increase mutual trade and economic ventures, encourage cultural ties and travel, confer on issues of mutual interest; e. g., SALT, and transfer of technology, both military and non-military. The transfer of military

technology and arms will be the most delicate issue as it would impact on Sino-Soviet relations. But the transfer of technologies involving, for example, agriculture and oil exploration would work to mutual advantage.

There are several actions on the world scene that need to and/or are being taken that will signal to the PRC the strength of our commitment and intentions and convey to the PRC the sincerity of any US-PRC action taken to increase communications between the two and work to the eventual goal of normalization.

The first is to continue the strong commitment to Europe as being in our vital interest. Any material action taken to strengthen NATO will be seen by the Chinese as appropriate to our interest and one seen as a balance to the Soviet threat to the PRC. However, these actions need to be taken and to be seen as supporting our interest and not as a divisive action between the Soviets and the PRC. In this regard, my previous perception of the NATO first position being at the expense of our Far East policy has changed. I now see it as supportive and vital to the relations being established in the Far East.

The second is the continuance of our policy of withdrawing ground troops from South Korea at a rate commensurate with the success of policies designed to assure the successful assumption by South Korea of its responsibility for its own defense. Again, this should function as a

assurance to the PRC that the United States will honor its commitments, protect its allies, and strive for regional stability.

The third is the set of actions I have discussed that are designed to broaden the power base of Japan by remilitarization, by continued mutually beneficial economic policies, and by increased interaction between the military staffs of the United States and Japan. These actions should bring Japan to the state where it interacts in the world community within the full panoply of super power interests. These actions should be discussed with the PRC on the basis that Japan has an important role to play in assuming more of its own defense burden and in ensuring regional stability.

The fourth is that set of actions designed to maintain our current level of military forces (less ground troops as determined by progress in South Korea) in the area to project military presence and power. The arms that would serve this purpose would be our air and naval forces kept in a modernized condition, professional, and ready.

These four actions rather than being viewed by the PRC and others as being destabilizing should be viewed, and it would be the duty of our leaders to so explain, as serving the interests of the United States. They are actions that are dictated by our commitments and are extensions required to cope with the changing realities of conditions in the Far East.

The fundamental considerations are that the United States should not get involved in a shooting ground war, should aim to strengthen its allies, and in the event of hostilities be prepared to repel hegemonic moves of either the PRC or the USSR beyond their present borders. This is not a policy of containment. It is a policy of serving our national interests in concert with our allies.

A look at a map confirms the need to retain current borders. The USSR is bounded by the Pacific and the PRC. The PRC is bounded by the USSR to the north and west, the Pacific to the east, and on the south by a Soviet leaning Vietnam and the Himalayas. The boundaries are set and any moves would have to be to the east and the southeast and these would require naval forces. Therefore, any policy to build offensive naval forces by the PRC would be destabilizing and hence the requirement for continued strong United States naval and air forces.

One last realization must be factored in. The PRC should conduct its foreign policy in such a way as to ensure that the United States and the USSR never feel the need to intervene to protect either's interest and that in achieving the national interest of each, hegemonic designs must be excluded as being detrimental to national security.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Thomas M. Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle, p. xi.
2. "China Reports Incidents Along Frontier," Washington Post, 8 February 1978, p. A23.
3. David K. Shipler, "Soviet Union Apologizes to China for Patrol That Crossed River," New York Times, 13 May 1978, p. 5.
4. "Peking Disputes Soviet on Incident," New York Times, 14 May 1978, p. 3.
5. Kevin Klose, "Breshnev, in a Signal to Chinese, Watches Maneuvers Near Border," Washington Post, 6 April 1978, p. A10.
6. "Breshnev Returns From Trip to Area Along China Border," New York Times, 10 April 1978, p. A14.
7. Jay Mathews, "Chinese Signal Hope for Closer Ties with U. S.," Washington Post, 7 March 1978, p. A1.
8. David K. Shipler, "New Rail Project Dramatizes Soviet Power," New York Times, 9 March 1978, p. A1.
9. Based on remarks by Dr. Valientin Karymov of the Soviet Far East Institute to Mr. William V. Kennedy, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute at the national conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, IL, April 1978.
10. US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Major U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Issues, p. 200.
11. US Congress, Kouse, Committee on International Relations, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, United States-China Relations: The Process of Normalization of Relations, p. 182-184.
12. Michael Lindsay, "Our Faulty 'Low Posture' Approach to China," Washington Post, 21 February 1978, p. A17.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

My expectation that participating in the considerations for a USAWC Sino-Soviet War Game would serve as a vehicle for expanding my knowledge of the Far East was more than fulfilled. In this paper I have contrasted my original constricted perceptions with those I have developed after a year of study. Hopefully, I have portrayed the latter as a consistent set of policies for the United States in the Far East that serves our national interest and is built on the principles we value.

I am convinced that study of the Far East is important for an Army Officer. To this end the course of instruction at the USAWC has served admirably. Also, the support provided by the library was superior in every way and was given in a gracious and cheerful manner. I feel that the curriculum has the right balance for preparing future senior officers. However, since our relations with the PRC and the USSR are key to our position in East Asia I recommend continued study of Sino-Soviet relations. The Sino-Soviet war game serves as an excellent vehicle for this purpose under the Military Studies Program. Not so much because I believe in either the probability or inevitability of the conflict (I don't) but, because of the opportunity it presents to study the whole spectrum of political, socio-psychological, economic, and military aspects of

that relation.

The question of whether or not to develop the war game itself is a separate question beyond the scope of this paper. The question can only be addressed in terms of what the role of the USAWC should be in developing strategy for the Department of the Army. Another separate, but related, question is that, given that the USAWC develop a computer assisted war game, what specific war game or area of the world should be played? That would have to be determined by the bent of those on the staff and faculty, the taskings, and the capabilities of other Army agencies with simulation facilities; e. g., Concepts Analysis Agency, Logistics Evaluation Agency, etc.

However, I do have some observations that impact on those questions. It is important that senior officers have an awareness of war-gaming and its strengths and weaknesses. This awareness is important if for no other reason than the capability is important in many decision making processes and, also, the Department of Defense depends so heavily on simulation techniques. Should the decision be made at the USAWC to develop a full capability I recommend the use of the IDAHEX model. It has the capability to be used in any theater and by virtue of its internal logic minimizes the demands on a war game designer. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that support of a good war game requires a massive effort in personnel support, data generation, and

analysis. I have tried to show this in the different approaches to studying logistics problems. IDAHEX has the further attractive feature that logistics are included, but only to the extent that it is but one important facet to be considered. All the other approaches are either too demanding in terms of personnel support or in terms of the level of detail required to study a given problem. Either of these reasons suffices to obviate the benefit of war game capability at the USAWC by enmeshing the player in too much detail. He would lose sight of the purpose of the game being played.

One last observation. The study approach employed was excellent. The highlight of the opportunities was the travel to the Far East. I am deeply appreciative of having the opportunity of taking advantage of the trip and of having the time under the Military Studies Program to concentrate on the Far East.

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